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Summary: In European societies of the early 21st century, the judicial-
isation of politics and society seems to be ‘a partial aspect of societal 
evolution’.1 Politics has become deeply judicialised and the judiciary 
has become profoundly involved in issues which used to be the sole 
domain of ‘pure’ politics.2 Some talk of ‘the secular papacy’, ie the 
judiciary of the Modern West playing the role of the 12th century pa-
pacy of the Medieval Western World.3 Others criticise the rise of ‘juris-
tocracy’ and the decline of popular politics.4Thus, it is not surprising 
that the phenomenon of ‘New Constitutionalism’ started to infl uence 
the emerging constitutionalisation of the European Communities in the 
1960s and 1970s. A specifi c regime of European ‘constitutional tol-
erance’5 involves constitutional and methodological pluralism among 
the Union and its Members, including the plurality of views on what 
is, and whether there is any, Grundnorm of the legal system, or who 
is the fi nal arbiter of European Constitutionalism. This sort of plural-
ism makes the domestic judicial acceptance of European doctrines a 
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1  Teubner, ‘Juridifi cation: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’ in G Teubner (ed) Juridifi -
cation of Social Spheres 3 27 (W de Gruyter, Berlin and New York 1987).
2  Miller, ‘Lords of Democracy: The Judicialization of “Pure Politics” in the United States and 
Germany’ (2004) 61 Wash. & Lee L Rev 587.
3  R Badinter and S. Breyer (eds), Judges in Contemporary Democracy: An International 
Conversation (NYU Press, New York 2004) 67, 79. 
4  R Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitution-
alism (Harvard 2004). It is true that the expansion of ‘New Constitutionalism’ also meant 
that ‘rights rhetoric’ proliferated and court-like rhetoric is now used in political discourse 
generally. Cf A Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges. Constitutional Politics in Europe (OUP, 
Oxford 2000). This, however, seems to approve Hirschl’s skeptical thesis about stealing 
politics from ‘We the People’.
5  Cf recently, eg JHH Weiler, ‘On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconogra-
phy’ (2005) 3 Intl J Const L 173, part 7. 
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necessary condition of the proper application of EU law. Thus, it is fair 
to say that the principle of primacy of European law cannot be under-
stood from the ECJ’s perspective only. Instead, the primacy of EU law 
is formed by both the ECJ and national high courts.6 
The logic of European integration empowered national ordinary courts 
and disempowered national constitutional courts through the Euro-
pean-style decentralised judicial review of national law for its compli-
ance with EU law.7 At the same time, the logic of ‘New Constitutional-
ism’ and the judicialisation of politics shifted the important last word 
of acceptance or veto over any European rule to national high courts, 
especially constitutional courts. Thereby, national constitutional courts 
appeared even stronger on the European scene. The lead was taken 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) in its in/famous 
‘Maastricht’ decision,8 which on a legalistic basis protects German 
sovereignty within the Union from the uncontrollable expansion of the 
Union’s power at the expense of the nation states. 
In fact, Western European national politics was able to internalise 
these powers which are supposedly vested in their constitutional 
courts. Far from being disappointed by the increasing powers of their 
constitutional courts, national politicians in turn might ‘play the consti-
tutional card’9 during European negotiations, claiming that the draft of 
the European legislation they oppose is likely to be found unconstitu-
tional by their constitutional court.
European constitutional justices are generated via the political pro-
cess and, unlike the United States Supreme Court justices, they do not 
have life tenure (with the exception of Austria, Belgium, and Malta).10 
This seems to guarantee that justices will cooperate with their nation-
al political elites on defending their respective countries’ interests and, 
at the same time, will not go far beyond the mainstream viewpoints 
on the proper relation between European and national legal systems. 
Perhaps this is the reason why constitutional justices could claim their 
6  See generally A-M Slaughter, A Stone Sweet, JHH Weiler (eds), The European Court and Na-
tional Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, Oxford 1998). For a recent update of the CEE 
constitutional courts, cf A Albi, ‘Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States: Bringing 
Parliaments into the Equation of “Co-operative Constitutionalism”’ (2007) 3 EuConst 25. 
7  Ferreres Comella, ‘The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: Toward 
Decentralization?’ (2004) 2 Intl J Const L 461.
8  BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993), English translation in 33 ILM 388 (1994).
9  Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Confl ict: Constitutional Supremacy in Eu-
rope before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 Eur LJ 262, 281.
10  Another obvious exception where justices have life tenure is the group of supreme courts 
of countries where these courts also exercise constitutional review (Ireland, Scandinavian 
nations).
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power which, if truly exercised, would destroy the complex design of 
the European Union.11
The New EU Member States developed strong constitutional courts in the 
course of the 1990s. The purpose of this paper is to show what the posi-
tion of these courts to EU law is, and the application of this law within 
the national legal system. After a brief introduction, the constitutional 
courts of the new EU Member States are introduced in the second and 
third section. The fourth and fi fth sections provide the core of the paper: 
an analysis of constitutional discourse relating to the European Arrest 
Warrant in Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. Whereas the Ger-
man and Polish constitutional courts annulled the national implementa-
tion of the European Arrest Warrant (though for different reasons), and 
the Polish legislature, acting as a constituent power, fi nally settled the 
issue, the Czech Constitutional Court upheld the respective Czech law. 
Finally, the sixth section offers my moderate conclusion which cautions 
against excessive judicial activism vis-à-vis EU law and calls for the 
inclusion of political forces into European constitutional debate. 
I An Overture
In the three-year saga of re-staffi ng the Czech Constitutional Court 
by the new President Klaus,12 the peak of the new President’s inability to 
offer reliable nominees to the Czech Senate came with the nomination of 
a state prosecutor in December 2004. The Senate reached almost una-
nimity in rejecting the nominee (11 in favour, 65 against), despite the fact 
that the President’s own Party controlled almost half of the Senate. The 
nominee ridiculed herself with her letter to the President, a well-known 
Eurosceptic, in which she denounced the European Arrest Warrant (the 
constitutionality of which was pending before the Constitutional Court), 
while writing articles celebrating the EAW at the same time. When the 
facts of her letter to the President became known to the public, the nomi-
nee was unable to explain her apparent inconsistency.13 
11  The most infl uential German doctrine of both kompetenz-kompetenz and substantial 
limits imposed on European Integration (Maastricht ruling) as well as the minimal level of 
protection of human rights at European level (BVerfGE 73, 339, Solange II of 1986) was in 
respect of the role of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. All relevant parties know about 
the impact of powers they claim, while at the same time they know that their real strength 
lies not in their actual use, but merely in their potential to be used. This comparison is 
made by Weiler and Haltern, ‘Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the Com-
munity Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ (n 6) 362.
12  See Kühn and Kysela, ‘Nomination of Constitutional Justices in Post-Communist Coun-
tries: Trial, Error, Confl ict in the Czech Republic’ (2006) 2 EuConst 183.
13  Moreover, the nominee’s long membership in the former Communist Party of Czechoslo-
vakia contributed to her failure. Cf the Senate of the Czech Republic, 16 December 2004, 
stenographic records, available at: <www.senat.cz> (in Czech). 
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Several months later, in spring 2005, President Klaus, who had al-
ways criticised referrals to the Constitutional Court by his predecessor 
Havel, sent a letter to the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, in 
which the President urged the Chief Justice to review the European Con-
stitutional Treaty. Because the Czech Republic had not started the proc-
ess of ratifi cation, and thus the Court did not have formal jurisdiction 
over the issue, the President’s request was politely rejected by the Chief 
Justice.14 
These two examples show that the respective post-communist po-
litical actors had already realised the importance of the Constitutional 
Court in pursuing their political agenda. The three Central European 
Constitutional Courts of Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic had 
already decided seminal issues on the relation of their legal and political 
system to the EU and EU law. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal (PCT) 
has already adjudicated several important cases, including the consti-
tutionality of elections to the EU Parliament and the constitutionality 
of the Polish Accession Treaty, as well as the unconstitutionality of the 
EAW under the Polish Constitution. In Slovakia, two important cases are 
before the Slovak Constitutional Court (SCC): fi rst, the Slovak Court has 
already decided that positive action in favour of an underprivileged race 
is not compatible with the Slovak Constitution;15 the second, pending 
case presents the issue whether parliamentary ratifi cation of the Euro-
pean Constitutional Treaty suffi ces or whether a referendum is required 
by the constitution.16 In the Czech Republic, the issues of the constitu-
tionality of sugar quotas, and especially that of the implementation of the 
European Arrest Warrant have been decided by the Czech Constitutional 
Court (CCC). 
These examples show that the new EU Members’ Constitutional 
Courts swiftly took on, or are about to take on, a role as fi nal arbiter of 
the constitutionality of EU action within their respective jurisdictions. 
That is why it is worth discussing these courts’ general attitudes to EU 
law and to fundamental issues of constitutionality and law. The issue 
of the EAW and the extradition of nationals fi rst decided by the Polish 
14  The President was apparently well aware of that and his letter might be interpreted as 
the political gesture of a man who had directed most of his political agenda to a critique of 
the EU. In more detail, see Kühn, ‘Ratifi cation without Debate and Debate without Ratifi ca-
tion: the European Constitution in Slovakia and the Czech Republic’ in A Albi and J Ziller 
(eds) The European Constitution and National Constitutions: The Ratifi cation and Beyond 
(Kluwer, The Hague 2007).
15  See the decision PL. ÚS 8/04-202 of 18 October 2005, available in Slovak <www.con-
court.sk>
16  For more details, see the translation in English <www.euroustava.sk/en> accessed 26 
September 2006.
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Constitutional Tribunal, which has been meanwhile adjudicated also in 
Germany and the Czech Republic, is the core of my analysis.17 
II The Post-communist Constitutional Courts: Introducing the Actors
In Poland, a constitutional tribunal was created in 1985 during the 
fi nal crisis of communism. The PCT did not become an important le-
gal and political factor until 1989, during the last months of the Polish 
communist regime. Its competences were broadened in the course of the 
1990s, and were modifi ed with the enactment of the new Polish Constitu-
tion of 1997.18 The Czechoslovak Constitutional Court, originally estab-
lished in 1920 and abolished by the communists, was recreated in 1992. 
Both republics which emerged from the vanished Czechoslovak Federa-
tion established their own constitutional courts in 1993.19 
In Poland, candidates for the PCT are nominated by at least 50 depu-
ties of the lower house (the Sejm) or by the presidium of the Sejm, and 
elected by a simple majority of votes in the Sejm.20 Unlike Germany, where 
bargaining between the opposition and the coalition is necessary,21 the 
Polish law means that the coalition controlling a simple majority in the 
lower house can elect justices completely disregarding the opposition. The 
practice shows, however, that the PCT has always been a predominantly 
academic court, and the process has selected the top Polish academ-
ics. In August 2005, of the fi fteen justices, eleven were law professors.22 
Between 1985 and 2001, thirty-six Polish justices served at the PCT, a 
number which included twenty-four law professors (fi ve of whom were 
also experienced practitioners), fi ve ordinary judges, three prosecutors, 
and two practising attorneys.23 In my view, the Polish system, despite the 
17  One must also note the Cypriot judgment of the Supreme Court of Cyprus of 7 Novem-
ber 2005, Ar No 294/2005 (a short English summary is available as Council document No 
14281/05 of 11 November 2005). 
18  Cf M Brzezinski, Struggle for Constitutionalism in Poland (St. Martin’s Press, New York 
1998).
19  On the Czech Constitutional Court, see G Brunner, M Hofmann and P Holländer, Verfas-
sungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Tschechischen Republik: Analysen und Sammlung ausgewähl-
ter Entscheidungen des Tschechischen Verfassungsgerichts (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2001). 
The best introduction to all four Central European constitutional courts is provided by R. 
Procházka, Mission Accomplished. On Founding Constitutional Adjudication in Central Eu-
rope (CEU Press, Budapest and New York 2002). 
20  Cf Art 5 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act <http://www.tribunal.gov.pl> (in English).
21  On staffi ng the FCC, see G Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany 
(CUP, Cambridge 2005) chapter 3.
22  The data according to the Tribunal’s Internet site: www.trybunal.gov.pl accessed 15 
August 2005. 
23  Garlicki, ‘The Experience of the Polish Constitutional Court’ in W. Sadurski (ed.) Consti-
tutional Justice, East and West. Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Postcom-
munist Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Kluwer, The Hague 2002) 269.
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absence of any checks and balances, has generated the most respected 
post-communist constitutional court.
The Czech Constitution follows the American model of staffi ng the 
Constitutional Court. The Constitution gives the President the power of 
nomination and the Senate the power of confi rmation of 15 constitutional 
justices.24 The term is ten years, and, unlike most other European coun-
tries, is renewable.25 The CCC appointed by President Havel tended to be 
composed of one third of legal academics, one third of practitioners, and 
one third of former ordinary judges. President Klaus, over a long process 
in the creation of the new court after the terms of most justices had ex-
pired in 2003, substantially changed the bench. Of fi fteen constitutional 
justices, three are President Havel’s remaining appointees who occupied 
vacancies between 2000 and 2002. Another three of Havel’s former jus-
tices were reappointed to the bench by President Klaus. If the CCC is tak-
en as a whole, three justices, including a new Chief Justice, are former 
top politicians, another three are law professors, four are former ordinary 
judges, two are attorneys and one is a former Czech representative at the 
European Commission of Human Rights.26 
The role and activity of Central European constitutional courts sub-
stantially differ. Some constitutional courts are much closer to real courts, 
adjudicating real-life cases, while other courts mostly deal with abstract 
issues only. For instance, the PCT exercises abstract constitutional re-
view of acts of parliaments.27 That is why one might fi nd in Poland only 
very indirect interactions between the constitutional and ordinary judi-
ciary. The basic mode of interaction is the judicial referral of the law’s 
constitutionality, while a constitutional complaint proper does not exist. 
In contrast, following the German model,28 the CCC exercises judicial 
24  See Czech Const. Art 84 § 2.
25  On this critically, see Kühn and Kysela (n 12).
26  The rest is diffi cult to specify. For more detail, see the article cited in n 25. Although the 
Central European model tends to generate law professors at the expense of other law pro-
fessions, considering the low status of legal academia during Czechoslovak’s ‘really exist-
ing socialism’, both Slovakia and the Czech Republic face more diffi culties in staffi ng their 
courts with competent academics.
27  Pol. Const. Art 79 § 1, Art 191 § 1 cl. 6.
28  See Art 13 § 8a of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (BVerfGG) and Grundgesetz [GG] 
[Constitution] Art 93 § 1 cl 4a and 4b of the Basic Law). Similarly, Spain (the organic law 
on the Constitutional Tribunal, Art 43ff). In post-communist Europe, this model is much 
less popular. Besides the Czech Republic (and since 2002, Slovakia), it seems to exist only 
in Slovenia (Art 21 para 1 (6) of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slov-
enia, Uradni list [Offi cial Gazette] No 15/1994, available in English at the website of the 
Slovenian Constitutional Court <www.us-rs.si/en/index.html> accessed 16 May 2003) and 
Croatia (Art 127 para 1 of the Constitution of Croatia, Art 62ff of the Constitutional Act on 
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, Narodne novine [Offi cial Gazette] no 
49/02 of 3 May 2002 <www.usud.hr> accessed 16 May 2003. 
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review both of the constitutionality of laws and the constitutionality of 
individual decisions, including the judgments of ordinary law courts.29 
The tendency to use constitutional adjudication as a means of pro-
longing or even revising the political battle lost in parliament found its 
way very quickly into post-communist political systems.30 Constitutional 
review in some post-communist systems is even more open to parlia-
mentarians because there is no time limit to refer the law to the court 
by Members of Parliament.31 Taking all data into account, the number of 
parliamentary referrals is similar to the most litigious Western European 
constitutional courts.32 
The political standing of the constitutional courts seems to be high. 
The peculiar situation of post-communist democracies where parliaments 
enjoy very little social prestige creates the specifi c situation of too power-
ful constitutional courts. The media usually present judicial opinions in 
a very different way from, for instance, the results of parliamentary votes. 
Unlike the latter political processes, judicial deliberation is conducted in 
closed chambers.33 The courts employ dogmatic German-style concep-
29  Procházka noted that the Czech Constitutional Court, because of its constitutional com-
plaints and the review of judicial decisions, is the most ‘judicial’ tribunal in Central Europe. 
Procházka (n 19) 166. 
30  For instance, in the Czech Republic, the number of parliamentary referrals between 
autumn 1993 and the end of 2004 was close to ten annually (91 referrals in total during 
the fi rst 12 years). Of these laws challenged, every third law was either totally or partially 
annulled. 
31  This is the case of both Poland and the Czech Republic. In contrast, German parliamen-
tarians can challenge the law within 30 days following its adoption. See BVerfGG Art 76 and 
Art 93 (1). Some post-communist systems provide a very diverse body of institutions which 
might challenge the law before the court. The Polish constitution provides a catalogue of 
institutions eligible to challenge the law before the PCT which is the most extensive one in 
Europe. In practice, apart from parliamentarians, the Ombudsman and local self-govern-
ments, unions, and trade organisations are also very active in activating the PCT. See the 
website of the PCT.
32  I have in mind especially the French Constitutional Council. After the fi rst important 
decade of the socialist government of the 1980s and is aftermath, the judicialisation of poli-
tics intensifi ed during the late 1990s and early 2000s, with its peak of 25 referrals in 2003. 
See A Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France. The Constitutional Council in Compara-
tive Perspective (OUP, New York 1992) 140ff and the Council’s website <www.conseil-con-
stitutionnel.fr> accessed 17 July 2005 respectively.
33  Cf Holmes and Sunstein, ‘The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe’ in S 
Levinson (ed), Responding to Imperfection. The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amend-
ment (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1995) 300 (claiming that ‘there is an unholy 
alliance here between the culture of communism and the culture of human-rights lawyers 
… The latter, too, believe that there is no room for bargaining when important things are 
at stake … The relatively high prestige of the constitutional courts in the region … may 
derive at least in part from the strange resemblance between this unelected body of people 
who make decisions in secret (without public bargaining) and the old Politburo (which also 
claimed to speak with the “higher voice of the people”).’ Cf also W Sadurski, Rights before 
Courts: a Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (Springer, Norwell MA 2005) 293.
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tual reasoning which keeps this form of decision-making from the atten-
tion of most political scientists. This further legitimises the court because 
it supports the all-embracing idea of the court as composed of unbiased 
judges who do not make the law, but rather interpret it. 
The fact that these views dominate general discourse explains the 
high public support for constitutional courts. However, out-of-sight dis-
regard for judicial rulings is not uncommon. In post-communist Europe, 
it is not exceptional for constitutional rulings to be disrespected by the 
public authorities and politicians. For instance, the legislature enacts a 
law, even though that law might be unconstitutional considering previ-
ous constitutional decisions. While this is almost unknown in Western 
countries, where some scholars even criticise ‘the excess of deference by 
members of Parliament toward the court’,34 frequent disregard of consti-
tutional rulings happens in the Czech Republic, Poland and other post-
communist countries with a still immature political culture.35
III Case Study: the EAW in Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic
A Introduction 
In our analysis of how the constitutional courts of Central Europe fi t 
within the complex scheme of EU law, an interesting comparison might 
be provided by several decisions relating to the implementation of the 
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (hereinafter ‘Framework 
Decision’).36 In principle, I will concentrate on one specifi c aspect of this 
34  Christine Landfried, ‘Germany’ in C Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder (eds), The Global 
Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press, New York and London 1995) 307, 
314.
35  Due to growing judicialisation at transnational level, national governments fi nd them-
selves more pressed to obey rulings of their own constitutional courts. For instance, the 
Court of Human Rights found that in the case of Polish rent control several constitutional 
rulings made by the PCT were disobeyed by the Polish legislature. The European Court 
found rent control as practiced in Poland contrary to the right to property, adjudicated 
against the Polish state and criticised Poland for non-compliance with the decisions of the 
PCT. See Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, application No 35014/97, the judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of 19 June 2006, para 208: ‘The Grand Chamber, in its assessment of the ap-
plicant’s situation in the period under consideration, shares the opinion expressed by the 
Constitutional Court, to which the Chamber subscribed, that the provisions of the 2001 Act 
as applicable at the relevant time unduly restricted her property rights and placed a dispro-
portionate burden on her, which cannot be justifi ed in terms of the legitimate aim pursued 
by the authorities in implementing the relevant remedial housing legislation’ (referring to 
the previous decision of the ECHR’s Chamber in the same case on 22 February 2005). 
36  See the Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (and surrender 
procedures between Member States) 2002/584/JHA, OJ L190/1 of 18 July 2002. Cf on 
this framework decision, inter alia, R Blekxtoon and W van Ballegooij (eds) Handbook on 
the European Arrest Warrant (Asser, The Hague 2004); Alegre and Leaf, ‘Mutual Recognition 
in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study - the European 
Arrest Warrant’, (2004) 10 Eur. LJ 200; Wouters and Naerts, ‘Of Arrest Warrants, Terror-
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complex law, which is the extradition of nationals,37 and in some respects 
also on the elimination of the requirement of double criminality.38 
The prohibition of extradition of nationals is a rule which was devel-
oped during the rise of the modern nation state on the European Conti-
nent throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. In contrast, the prohibition 
of extradition of nationals has never been fi rmly established in the Anglo-
Saxon world.39 In fact, only in the 19th century did the growing mobility of 
Europeans present extradition as a practical issue. The prohibition to ex-
tradite nationals was originally understood to maintain the jurisdiction of 
the state over its subjects rather than to protect the rights of citizens.40 
Moreover, mutual distrust of the nation states in their exercise of 
justice played a substantive role in strengthening the rule. Writing more 
than two hundred years ago, the Marquis of Beccaria refused to decide 
the issue whether or not to extradite nationals until tyranny disappeared 
from Europe and all European states acknowledged ‘the universal empire 
of reason’:
Whether it be useful that nations should mutually deliver up their 
criminals? Although the certainty of there being no part of the earth 
where crimes are not punished, may be means of preventing them, 
I shall not pretend to determine this question, until laws more con-
formable to the necessities, and rights of humanity, and until milder 
punishments, and the abolition of arbitrary power of opinion, shall 
afford security to virtue and innocence when oppressed; and until tyr-
ist Offences and Extradition Deals: An Appraisal of the EU’s Main Criminal Law Measures 
against Terrorism after “11 September”’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 909. 
37  For a superb analysis of this concept in general, see Plachta, ‘(Non-)Extradition Of Na-
tionals: A Neverending Story?’ (1999) 13 Emory Intl L Rev 77.
38  Framework Decision (n 36) Art 2 (2). 
39  HC Biron and KE Chalmers, The Law and Practice of Extradition (Stevens & Son, London 
1903) 13 (‘… it may be observed that the most liberal governments of the world - those of 
this country [the United Kingdom] and the United States of America - are now sometimes 
willing to surrender their own subjects, even in some cases where they do not meet with 
reciprocal treatment. … These facts may be fairly taken as an index of the general feeling in 
this country which is in favour of the surrender of all fugitive offenders of whose guilt of a 
crime punishable in this country a prima facie has been made out, a feeling which is due to 
the consciousness that such a policy is in accord with the interest of this country, and it is 
reasonable to suppose that this view of extradition is appealing to the other civilized nations 
of the world, and increasingly so as the general balance of convenience is recognised to be 
in favour of reducing obstacles to extradition’). This book is cited by the CCC in its EAW 
case (see para 75, noting that ‘British lawyers have traditionally preferred this approach to 
that of the European continental countries’). Cf a declaration of 1968 by the Speaker of the 
British House of Commons: ‘We don’t feel outraged honour at the thought of delivering an 
Englishman into the hands of foreign judges. He is fi rst of all a criminal and only after that 
an Englishman’ (quoted by Plachta (n 37) 94).
40  Plachta (n 37) 82.
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anny shall be confi ned to the plains of Asia, and Europe acknowledge 
the universal empire of reason by which the interests of sovereigns 
and subjects are best united.41
The fact that it is not only the European Court of Justice42 which 
claims that the mutual distrust of European nations is a matter of the 
past, the prohibition of extradition of nationals offers an interesting test 
case on the positions of constitutional courts. Likewise, the elimination of 
the double criminality requirement would also test the degree of mutual 
trust between the EU Member States. After all, referring to the EAW, Ad-
vocate General Colomer noted that this law created ‘a far-reaching debate 
concerning the risk of incompatibility between the constitutions of the 
Member States and European Union law.’43 
In the ongoing saga of the EAW, fi rst the PCT declared the imple-
mentation of the EAW unconstitutional in Poland insofar as it allows the 
surrender of Polish nationals.44 Poland implemented45 the EAW despite 
Art 55 of the Polish Constitution which explicitly prohibits the extradition 
of Polish nationals (‘Extradition of a Polish national is prohibited.’). Al-
though expert opinion on this was divided,46 the constitutional text itself 
was clear and allowed no exception to the prohibition of the extradition 
41  C. Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishment (Philip H. Nicklin, Philadephia 1819) 
135-136 (emphasis added). 
42  Joined cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Criminal proceedings against Hüseyin Gözütok 
(C-187/01) and Klaus Brügge (C-385/01) [2003] ECR I-1345, paragraph 33: ‘… the Member 
States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and … each of them recognises 
the criminal law in force in the other Member States even when the outcome would be dif-
ferent if its own national law were applied.’
43  The opinion of Advocate General Colomer of 12 September 2006, case C-303/05, Advo-
caten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, para 8. However, neither the Court 
of Justice nor its Advocate General contributed much to this debate (cf the decision of the 
Court of 3 May 2007).
44  The case P 1/05, quoted according to the Polish text published in Orzecznictwie Try-
bunalu Konstytucyjnego. Zbiór urzędowy [Collection of Decisions of the Constitutional Tri-
bunal. Offi cial Collection, hereinafter ‘OTK ZU’] 2005 ser A, nr 4, item 42 (unless specifi -
cally referred to, the English summary available on the Tribunal’s website). Cf case notes 
in Poland by Czapliński, Hofmański, Plachta and Wieruszewski, all in Państwo i Prawo 
no 9/2005; English translation in Łazowski, ‘Constitutional Tribunal on the Surrender of 
Polish Citizens Under the European Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 April 2005’ (2005) 1 Eu-
Const 569; Wyrozumska, ‘Some Comments on the Judgments of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal on the EU and on the Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant’ (2004-
2005) 27 PYIL 7; or an analysis of both the German and Polish decision by Jan Komárek, 
‘European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: Contrapunctual Principles 
in Disharmony’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/05.
45  See the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code of 18 May 2004, Offi cial Gazette (Dz.
U.) 2004 no 69 item 626. 
46  Cf in English the report by Agnieszka Grzelak at the XXI FIDE Congress, Dublin, June 
2004, part C, point 3 <http://www.fi de2004.org> (claiming that the majority of Polish 
scholars did not consider it unconstitutional).
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of nationals. The Tribunal acted based on a reference of the district court 
which was dealing with the case of surrender of a Polish national to the 
Netherlands. In an interesting exercise of inter-judicial dialogue, the dis-
trict court openly doubted the soundness of the Euro-friendly construc-
tion of national constitutional law. It would be ‘risky’, in the opinion of 
the district court, if this sort of construction should limit basic rights.47 
One can easily see that the district court disputed the potential range of 
the earlier doctrines made by the PCT.48 
The German FCC declared the German act unconstitutional three 
months later, on 18 July 2005.49 The case was based on the constitution-
al complaint of a German and Syrian citizen, Mamoun Darkazanli, who 
was about to be surrendered to the Spanish authorities. The Spanish au-
thorities wanted Darkazanli for his alleged participation in the al-Qaeda 
terror network in Europe. Unlike both Poland and the Czech Republic, 
Germany had amended its constitution which expressly provided for an 
exception from the originally unexceptional prohibition of the extradition 
of nationals.50
Finally, on 3 May 2006 the CCC rejected the proposal fi led by the 
opposition parliamentarians to annul the Czech implementation of the 
EAW. The parliamentarians of the conservative Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS) argued that the possibility to surrender Czech citizens abroad un-
der the EAW was in confl ict with Art 14 para 4 of the Czech Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, according to which no citizen may be forced to leave 
his homeland. The prohibition laid down in this article was clear and 
unconditional in the petitioners’ view. Moreover, facing poor defi nitions 
in the lists of offences for which the double criminality principle is not 
required, the petitioners based their arguments on the violation of the 
principle ‘No crime without the law’.51 
47  See part 1.4 of the decision of 27 April 2005.
48  See n 53 and the accompanying text.
49  See the FCC, 2 BvR 2236/04 of 18 July 2005, paras (1-201) <http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/rs20050718 2bvr223604.html> also published in [2005] 58 NJW [Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift] 2289. See Böhm, ‘Das Europäische Haftbefehlsgesetz und seine 
rechtsstaatlichen Mängel’ (2005) 58 NJW 2588; Vogel, ‘Europäischer Haftbefehl und deut-
sches Verfassungsrecht’ (2005) 60 Juristen Zeitung 801; translation in English, for ex-
ample, in Tomuschat, ‘Inconsistencies - The German Federal Constitutional Court on the 
European Arrest Warrant’ (2006) 2 EuConst 209; in German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
Decision of 18 July 2005, with annotation by Parga, (2006) 43 (2) CML Rev 583; Mölders, 
‘Case Note - The European Arrest Warrant in the German Federal Constitutional Court’ 7 
German LJ No 1 (1 January 2006) <www.germanlawjournal.com>
50  See GG, Art 16 § 2. 
51  See the judgment of 3 May 2006, published in Czech as No 434/2006 Sb [Offi cial Ga-
zette], the full English translation (used also in this paper) is available on the Court’s web-
site <www.concourt.cz>
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B Polish, German and Czech Formalisms Compared
The unanimous decision of the PCT might be considered both for-
malist and EU-friendly. The PCT emphasised that its task was to review 
the constitutionality of all laws, including those which implement EU 
law into national law.52 At the same time, it highlighted (while referring 
to the ECJ case law) that the Euro-friendly construction of national law 
underscored by its earlier decisions had its limits and could not worsen 
the position of an individual.53 
The Euro-friendly position of the Polish justices could be seen 
throughout the judgment. The Tribunal repeated several times that the 
EAW was a measure of utmost importance54 and deserved ‘maximum 
priority by the Polish legislature’.55 On the other hand, although it is 
possible to notice ‘the general trend of the decline of the role which state 
citizenship has in determining the legal status of an individual’, it is not 
up to the justices to change the constitution through creative ‘dynamic 
interpretation’, especially facing a strict and unconditional prohibition in 
Art 55 § 1 of the Polish Constitution.56 The PCT reminded us that dur-
ing the drafting of the Constitution, the opinion that ‘the extradition of 
nationals is the most extreme limitation of state sovereignty’57 effectively 
barred any exception to the constitutional ban on extradition. Thus, doc-
trinal arguments calling for the balancing of Art 55 against other consti-
tutional provisions were ultimately refused.58
Because one argument to uphold the law was an emphasis on the 
difference between extradition and surrender (only the former is prohib-
ited by the Constitution, whereas criminal law talks about surrender), 
the PCT struggled with the concept of extradition and surrender. The 
Tribunal did not accept simple textual formalism and replaced it with its 
own systemic formalism when it summarised the basic differences be-
tween both concepts. Finally, the PCT reasoned that surrender was not 
qualitatively different from extradition, and if it differed, it was rather a 
more severe form of extradition.59 That is why the PCT reasoned a minori 
ad maius.60 Thus, on the one hand, the Euro-friendly court demarcated 
52  See part 2.4 of the decision, quoted in n 44.
53  Ibid 3.4.
54  Ibid part 4.3.
55  Ibid part 5.9.
56  Ibid 4.3.
57  Ibid 3.1.
58  Ibid 4.1, 4.2.
59  Ibid 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6.
60  Ibid 3.6.
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limits of judicial creativity, and, on the other hand, called (or even urged) 
the legislature to intervene and amend the Constitution.
When one compares both the German and Polish decisions, the per-
spective in which they fundamentally differ is in the fi nal verdict and 
temporal consequences of the decision. First, the Polish CT (being bound 
by the ordinary court’s referral) declared unconstitutional only the provi-
sion of the Criminal Procedure Code which allows the extradition of Polish 
nationals. Moreover, and even more importantly, the PCT took pains to 
justify that although the extradition of nationals is unconstitutional, it 
must be nevertheless applied until the Constitution is amended. The PCT 
gave Parliament 18 months for this amendment; if no amendment was 
made within this period, the decision would take effect and no extradi-
tion of nationals would be allowed. The PCT’s argument was based on the 
constitutional provision which declares that Poland obeys international 
law61 and also on Polish obligations to the EU. The PCT devoted to the 
issue a substantial portion of its opinion62 which might be also explained 
by earlier frequent clashes between the ordinary judiciary and the con-
stitutional judiciary.63 
In contrast, the FCC forgot all its judicial creativity and annulled the 
law on the implementation of the EAW64 in its entirety, despite the fact 
that in most parts the constitutionality of the law was unquestioned65 
and there was a way to avoid this conclusion through an EU-friendly 
interpretation of domestic law66 (in fact, exactly as the CCC fi nally did, 
as I show below). In reality, there were only limited problems with the 
German act: the principal problems for the German justices were, fi rst, 
the fact that the German act did not implement Article 4 para 7 of the 
Framework Decision (the optional grounds for refusal to surrender per-
sons suspected of offences committed on German soil), thus making the 
application of the EAW in Germany for German nationals disproportional 
under the German constitution; second, the fact that the German act, in 
the view of the Court, did not provide for suffi cient judicial review;67 and 
61  Pol. Const. Art 9.
62  See part 5 of the decision quoted in n 44.
63  Anna Wyrozumska, ‘Direct Application of the Polish Constitution and International Trea-
ties to Private Conduct’ (2001) 25 PYIL 5.
64  Das Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Rahmenbeschlusses über den Europäischen Haftbe-
fehl und die Übergabeverfahren zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union 
(Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz - EuHbG) vom 21. Juli 2004 (Bundesgesetzblatt I Seite 
1748).
65  Critically on this, the dissenting opinion of Justice Lübbe-Wolff, internet version part 
181, NJW (2005) 2301. 
66  Tomuschat (n 49) 222; Parga (n 49) 592.
67  For the problems of this conclusion, see Tomuschat (n 49) 223-225.
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fi nally, the retroactive effects of the EAW for crimes committed on Ger-
man soil.
Thus, according to a dissenting Justice, ‘by annulling the law which 
by and large might have been applied without any constitutional prob-
lem, the Senate [of the FCC] forces the Federal Republic of Germany to 
violate Union law’ which could have been avoided without constitution-
al violation.68 In this comparison, it seems that while international and 
European law represents for the Polish Constitution a compelling value 
which, for some time, allows even the violation of constitutional rights, 
the German constitution does not refl ect German international obliga-
tions to any substantial degree. 
The real explanation, however, lies rather in analysing what the con-
stitutional courts wanted to show the ECJ and the Union’s authorities. 
On the one hand, the PCT, a newcomer in the EU, making its fi rst funda-
mental decision, disputing in effect the constitutionality of the European 
act, did its best not to look in a bad light in European discourse. On 
the other hand, the FCC, a well-known defender of national basic rights 
against European encroachments, wanted to send an important signal 
to Brussels and Luxembourg.69 Unlike the PCT, the FCC did not ques-
tion the constitutionality of the extradition (surrender) of nationals itself, 
but only some features of its national implementation. Thus, it was able 
to show the EU that the FCC was there, defending basic constitutional 
rights. The best way to do this was through the dramatic effect of annul-
ling the whole law on the implementation of the EAWFD. The actual dam-
age,70 however, would be short-term because enacting a new law would 
not present a long-lasting problem for the legislature. Quite the contrary, 
the damage done by the Euro-friendly PCT might have been considerable: 
the search for a supermajority to amend the constitution was expected to 
be very diffi cult on the Polish fragmented political scene.71
68  The decision quoted in n 49, internet version 182 NJW (2005) 2301.
69  ‘Having perused the judgment, the reader has defi nitely the impression that the Karl-
sruhe judges again wanted to make their views on the limits of European integration clear, 
but the case was not well suited for such a decision of principle.” Tomuschat (n 49) 226.
70  Though not entirely negligible. See Komárek (n 44) 21 (explaining the actual situation af-
ter the effects of the German decision, which created a diffi cult Catch-22: ‘Germany cannot 
request surrender on the EAW basis because the FCC has erased it from the German legal 
system. On the other hand, however, the other Member States cannot extradite requested 
persons but on the EAW basis’).
71  Art 55 of the Polish Constitution, as amended in September 2006, reads as follows 
(found on the website of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal <www.trybunal.gov.pl>: 
‘1. The extradition of a Polish citizen shall be prohibited, except in cases specifi ed in paras 
2 and 3.
2. Extradition of a Polish citizen may be granted upon a request made by a foreign state or 
an international judicial body if such a possibility stems from an international treaty rati-
fi ed by Poland or a statute implementing a legal instrument enacted by an international 
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When reading the PCT’s opinion, the justices’ pro-European stances 
are very visible. In fact, the confl ict between EU law and the constitution 
seemingly presented an easy case, solvable by systemic formalism. The 
PCT did not try to make this case hard by questioning the very meaning 
of extradition: by applying the prohibition of extradition of nationals not 
as a straightforward rule but rather as the principle subject to balance 
confl icting rights and interests. Apparently willing to take its constitution 
seriously, the Tribunal did not want to overstep the boundaries of consti-
tutional adjudication.72 
If the PCT exercised what it calls ‘dynamic constitutional interpreta-
tion’, it would be, in the Tribunal’s opinion, an infringement of the divi-
sion of powers between the constitution-maker and the interpreter of 
the constitution. It does not mean, however, that the Tribunal is some 
sort of formalist self-restrained court. The PCT emphasised that it would 
not engage in ‘dynamic interpretation’, considering the importance of the 
principle of non-extradition of nationals within the Polish constitutional 
system, as proved, after all, by the clear intention of the constitution 
drafters. The PCT thus sits easily within a superb analysis by Mattias 
Kumm on the primacy of EU law, which suggests that 
[w]hen EU law confl icts with clear and specifi c national constitu-
tional norms that refl ect a national commitment to a constitutional 
essential, concerns related to democratic legitimacy override con-
siderations relating to the uniform and effective enforcement of EU 
law.73 
organisation of which the Republic of Poland is a member, provided that the act covered by 
a request for extradition:
1. was committed outside the territory of the Republic of Poland, and
2. constituted an offence under the law in force in the Republic of Poland or would have 
constituted an offence under the law in force in the Republic of Poland if it had been com-
mitted within the territory of the Republic of Poland, both at the time of its commitment and 
at the time of the making of the request.
3. Compliance with the conditions specifi ed in para 2 subparas 1 and 2 shall not be re-
quired if an extradition request is made by an international judicial body established under 
an international treaty ratifi ed by Poland, in connection with a crime of genocide, crime 
against humanity, war crime or a crime of aggression, covered by the jurisdiction of that 
body. 
4. The extradition of a person suspected of the commission of a crime for political reasons 
but without the use of force shall be forbidden, just as an extradition which would violate 
rights and freedoms of persons and citizens.
5. The courts shall adjudicate on the admissibility of extradition.
72  Cf Komárek (n 44) 12.
73  Kumm (n 9) 298. Cf ibid 300 (‘a thick European identity even if the Constitutional Treaty 
will be ratifi ed—national courts continue to have good reasons to set aside EU Law when 
it violates clear and specifi c constitutional norms that refl ect essential commitments of the 
national community’).
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The Polish Tribunal did not fi nd itself competent to apply systemic or 
teleological arguments capable of overriding the prohibition of extradition 
of nationals. Thus, at the end of the day its reasoning was rather formal-
ist. In contrast, the German Court used formalist reasoning pursuing its 
own policy agenda in order to strike down the entire German act. 
Although the Czech EAW case bears plenty of purposive and his-
torical arguments rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the con-
stitutional text, we can fi nd a very different type of formalism in some 
paragraphs of the Czech decision, too. This sort of formalism helped to 
uphold fully the EAW. For instance, formalist reasoning was applied by 
the Czech justices in order to avoid some tough questions relating to dif-
ferent standards of the protection of basic rights in criminal proceedings 
in different European countries. 
Unlike some evident doubts of the German FCC about the degree of 
mutual trust between EU Member States,74 the CCC refers to the ECJ’s 
judgment (as proof that ‘the Member States have mutual trust in their 
criminal justice systems’) and to the fact that ‘all EU Member States are 
also signatories of the European Convention.’ Both these facts suppos-
edly prove that ‘a citizen cannot be signifi cantly affected in his rights due 
to the fact that his criminal matter will be decided in another Member 
State of the Union.’75
C Historical Memories in Germany and the Czech Republic and their 
Impact
The PCT, except for a few haphazard remarks, did not analyse the 
very purpose of extradition. In contrast, the FCC started with a careful 
analysis of the concept of extradition and its constitutional purpose. 
The FCC shows a much more statist view than the PCT.76 The FCC’s 
opinion was that the prohibition of the extradition of nationals was not 
only the expression of the responsibility of the state for its own nation-
als, but that nationals should not be removed from the legal order to 
which they are accustomed. Nationals have a special relationship to their 
democratic community which also means in principle that they cannot 
be excluded from this community. The FCC emphasised the importance 
of that principle by referring to the (sad) German historical experience of 
74  The German decision (n 49) para 76ff, NJW (2005) 2291 (urging the German legislature 
to react if necessary). Cf para 79, noting that ‘a basis for mutual confi dence exists’ (empha-
sis added).
75  Para 86 of the Czech EAW case (n 51). 
76  The latter admitted ‘the general trend of the decline of the role which state citizenship 
has in determining the legal status of an individual’ (n 56 and the accompanying text).
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persecution and exclusion of Jews.77 Still, after the recent constitutional 
amendment, the principle is not without exceptions.78 Interestingly, the 
FCC emphasised that this new constitutional exception is not ‘uncon-
stitutional constitutional law’ (verfassungswidriges Verfassungsrecht)79 
within the meaning of its Maastricht jurisprudence.
The CCC also dealt in detail with the rationale of the prohibition 
of extradition of nationals, but its analysis of both the history and the 
purpose of the Czech provision were strikingly different from that of its 
German counterpart. First, like the FCC, the CCC explained the history 
of the basic right of Czech citizens ‘not to be forced to leave their home-
land’.80 This prohibition refl ects, in the Court’s opinion, ‘the experience 
with the crimes of the Communist regime’, namely with the operation 
‘in which the Communist regime forced troublesome persons to leave 
the Republic.’ Although the Court might have followed the German logic 
and emphasised the impact of this unhappy historical experience for the 
current situation and for the protection of Czech citizens,81 the Court 
argued to the contrary. It seems that the Czech provision was never con-
cerned with extradition, the Court explained. Still, the question whether 
the original meaning should be expanded cannot be decided solely by 
reference to ‘the intention of the constitutional framers.’82 
For this reason, the CCC tried to determine the objective of Art 14 
para 4 against the backdrop of ‘contemporary life and institutions at the 
start of the 21st century’. The Court emphasised that in view of the low 
mobility of Europe’s inhabitants at the beginning of the 19th century, ‘as 
well as the very limited degree of cooperation among the then European 
states, [extradition] did not even constitute much of a weighty issue.’ 
Because the modern concept of extradition emerged as late as in the 
19th century, many of its features still carry signs of that era.83 The CCC 
concluded its purposive approach by contrasting the 19th century with 
77  The German EAW decision (n 49) internet version paras 65 - 67, NJW (2005) 2290.
78  Referring to the 47th Amendment of the German Basic Law, Bundesgesetzblatt 2000, 
part I, 1633. 
79  The German EAW decision (n 49) internet version para 70, NJW (2005) 2290.
80  Art 14 para 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
81  As dissenting Justice Balík eventually did.
82  The Czech EAW case (n 51) paras 66-67 (the intention of the constitutional framers is 
not a decisive argument ‘where it is based on historical experience, particularly in the cir-
cumstance where historical memory fades and cannot be passed on to future generations, 
because they are bound up with the experience of their own times’). It must be noted that 
in Poland the history of drafting the Constitution was recorded through many reports, 
whereas the Czech Bill of Rights does not have any ‘travaux preparatoires’. See Filip, ‘Ev-
ropský zatýkací rozkaz a rozhodování ústavních soudů’ [The European Arrest Warrant and 
Constitutional Decision-Making] (2005) 6 (8) Právní zpravodaj 1, 4. 
83  The Czech EAW case (n 51) paras 68-69.
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‘the current period … connected with an extraordinarily high mobility of 
people, ever-increasing international cooperation and growing confi dence 
among the democratic states of the EU …’84 In the CCC’s logic, the EAW 
refl ects the new rights of Czech citizens who have also become European 
citizens, which brings them also new responsibilities of the 21st century, 
nonexistent in the old Europe of closed borders.85
The CCC did not limit its reasoning to this policy-line of arguments. 
It seems that the CCC was the only court which did not just analyse the 
rights of the accused person, but also the interests of victims.86 According 
to the CCC, the extradition of nationals to the place where the criminal act 
was committed aims to improve the fair trial for both accused and victim: 
… it is necessary to take into account not only the protection of rights 
of persons suspected of committing a criminal act, but also the inter-
ests of the victims of criminal acts. For the protection of the rights of 
victims and injured persons, it generally appears more practical and 
fair for the criminal proceeding to be held in the state in which the 
criminal act was committed … Since the execution of the European 
Arrest Warrant, in the case a state is surrendering its own citizen, is 
conditioned on reciprocity …, the rules contested by the petitioners 
protect the rights of persons who can be considered, according to the 
Czech Criminal Procedure Code, as injured persons. It can gener-
ally be said that, in view of the evidence that will found in the state 
where the criminal act occurred, a criminal proceeding there will be 
quicker, more effective and, at the same time, more reliable and just 
both for the defendant and for any victim of the criminal act.87
D The Role of Law Courts and the Legislature in the Protection of 
Basic Rights 
The Polish Tribunal’s strategy was to emphasise that the job of open-
ing the gate to the EAW vis-à-vis Polish nationals rests exclusively within 
84  Ibid para 70.
85  ‘If Czech citizens enjoy certain advantages, connected with the status of EU citizenship, 
then naturally in this context a certain degree of responsibility must be accepted along with 
these advantages. The investigation and suppression of criminality which takes place in the 
European area, cannot be successfully accomplished within the framework of individual 
Member States, but requires extensive international cooperation. The results of this cooper-
ation is the replacement of the previous procedures for the extradition of persons suspected 
of criminal acts by new and more effective mechanisms, refl ecting the life and institutions of 
the 21st Century’ ibid para 71 (emphases added).
86  Considering the nature of the proceedings before the Czech Court (abstract review based 
on the petition of parliamentarians), the Czech Court was perhaps the best suited to make 
this argument.
87  Ibid para 96.
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the legislature. The PCT rejected any possibility of creative ‘dynamic in-
terpretation’ which might make the full application of the EAW in Poland 
possible. In contrast, the CCC openly asserted a much more active role 
and, according to some domestic critics, rewrote the Constitution.88 
One might wonder why the Polish Tribunal emphasised so much that 
the implementation of the EAW was desirable. These arguments cannot 
be fully understood beyond their context. Throughout the subsequent 
process of amending the Polish Constitution, the patriotic and nationalist 
Polish political forces used these appeals by the Tribunal to relieve them 
of part of their own responsibility for the amendment to the Constitution 
which might be viewed by some of their electorate as unacceptable con-
cessions to ‘Brussels’. During parliamentary hearings, both the deputies 
and the senators frequently referred to the Tribunal’s ruling. Thus, the 
Tribunal’s justifi cation contributed to the fact that the Constitution was 
amended by overwhelming majorities of both deputies and senators.89 In 
this way, the limited judicialisation of the problem by the PCT (appeals to 
the legislature) was fully utilised by the subsequent political process in 
the Polish Parliament.
The delimitation of powers between the German judiciary and the 
German courts as envisaged by the FCC is complex and sometimes dif-
fi cult to understand. First, the FCC criticised its legislature which did not 
use all the range offered by the Framework Decision for the protection of 
German nationals. The implementing law did not implement Art 4 (7) of 
the Framework Decision which gives the national authorities discretion 
whether or not to extradite a person who allegedly committed a crime on 
that state’s own territory. In fact, in such a case, the accused national 
has special confi dence in being prosecuted by its own state for the viola-
tion of its own law on German soil.90
In contrast, the Czech Court was much more activist in its answer 
to the very same question. Although the Czech legislature did not imple-
ment Art 4 para 7 of the Framework Decision, this did not prevent the 
CCC from incorporating this provision by its own judgment. The CCC 
found this leeway in a general clause of Art 377 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code which says that the request of a foreign state’s organ may not be 
granted if, inter alia, its granting would constitute a violation of the Czech 
Constitution. The CCC interpreted the said Art 377 ‘in the light of Art 4 
(7) of the Framework Decision’, with the result that 
88  Cf the dissenting opinion of Justice S Balík.
89  See the hearings in the Sejm on 8 September 2006 and the Senate on 14 September 
2006. The fi nal vote in the Sejm was 344 deputies in favour, 48 against, with 29 abstentions 
<http://www.sejm.gov.pl>. The vote in the Senate was unanimous <http://www.senat.gov.
pl>. For the text of the amended Constitution, Art 55, see n 71.
90  The German EAW case (n 49) paras 82ff, NJW (2005) 2292-3.
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a Czech citizen will not be surrendered to another EU Member State 
due to suspicion of having committed a criminal offense, if it was al-
legedly committed within the Czech Republic, except in cases where, 
in view of the special circumstances of the commission of the crimi-
nal act, priority must be given to holding the criminal prosecution 
in the requesting state, for example, on grounds of adequate fact-
fi nding concerning the conduct in question, if in the greater part it 
occurred abroad, or because prosecution in the given EU Member 
State would, in that particular case, be more appropriate than that 
person’s prosecution in the Czech Republic.91 
Interestingly, the FCC urges the legislature to react unilaterally if 
the German confi dence in the criminal justice of another Member State 
is shaken. In this, the FCC claims, the legislature is unrestrained by the 
fact whether or not proceedings against the respective state according to 
EU law were initiated. Here, one might see a sort of judicial self-restraint: 
the Court does not claim the competence to decide that another Member 
State violated signifi cantly its human rights obligations. Instead, it en-
trusted the legislature to indicate when German confi dence in another 
State’s criminal justice is shaken.92 
The second reason why the German act was unconstitutional is 
based on the fact that it did not give persons the right to appeal a decision 
granting surrender. The FCC refused the earlier opinions that extradition 
should not be reviewed by courts because of its international and politi-
cal aspects which are within the competence of executive power. Facing 
the new circumstances of the EAW, these old opinions had to be refused 
and the law had to enable judicial review of extradition decisions.93 
In the same way, but much more vigorously, the CCC emphasised 
the role of law courts in protecting nationals and others against (unlikely 
though it might be, in the view of the CCC) the abuse of the EAW. The 
91  The Czech EAW case (n 51) para 113.
92  The German EAW case (n 49) para 79, NJW (2005) 2291: ‘In this context, the legislature 
must verify when restricting fundamental rights that the observance of rule-of-law princi-
ples by the authority that claims punitive power over a German is guaranteed. Here, it will 
have to be taken into account that every Member State of the European Union is to observe 
the principles set out in Article 6.1 of the Treaty on European Union, and thus also the 
principle of proportionality and that therefore, a basis for mutual confi dence exists. This, 
however, does not release the legislature from reacting, in cases in which such confi dence 
in the general conditions of procedure in a Member State has been profoundly shaken, and 
from doing so irrespective of proceedings pursuant to 7 of the Treaty on European Union.’ 
Cf the dissenting opinion of Justice Lübbe-Wolff, para 175 NJW (2005) 2301 (in her opin-
ion, this should be within the competence of either the executive or judicial power) and 
critically Tomuschat (n 49) 215 (explaining that the legislature has no place in individual 
cases but might interfere via a general enactment if necessary).
93  The German EAW case (n 49) para 101ff, NJW (2005) 2294ff.
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CCC was in a different position from the FCC because the Czech act 
did not exclude judicial review of the ultimate decision on surrender.94 
Founding the ultimate justifi cation of its decision on this fact, the CCC 
held that although the implementation was not unconstitutional as such, 
an individual arrest warrant might still be unconstitutional in a real-life 
case on account of its confl ict with the Constitution,95 as, after all, fore-
seen by Art 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code.96
 Facing both the Czech and German decision, we see, as some schol-
ars had correctly predicted,97 that the EAW will not entirely depoliticise 
extradition proceedings among the EU Member States. Instead, due to 
the requirements of the constitutional courts, it would be rather another 
step forward in both the judicialisation of European politics and the po-
liticisation of the judiciary. After all, even the 2006 amendment to the 
Polish Constitution highlights the role of law courts in protecting indi-
vidual rights during EAW proceedings.98
E Double Criminality in Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland
Lifting the double criminality rule seems to be one of the most con-
troversial novelties introduced by the EAW Framework Decision.99 There-
fore, no wonder that both the German and Czech judgments were very 
reserved vis-à-vis this innovation. Moreover, as we shall see, the Polish 
legislature rejected this requirement as regards Polish nationals explicitly 
through a constitutional amendment. All three systems thus remain, to 
94  The construction of the Czech law is different from that of its German counterpart.
95  Para 115 of the Czech EAW case (references omitted): ‘Even though the contested provi-
sions … might be applied in an unconstitutional manner, such a hypothetical and unlikely 
situation does not provide grounds for their annulment. [The Court’s case law says] that 
“theoretically every provision of a legal enactment can naturally be applied incorrectly, 
hence even in confl ict with constitutional acts, which in and of itself does not constitute 
grounds for the annulment of a provision which can conceivably be incorrectly applied.” 
[The purpose of this proceeding] is not, however, to resolve every single hypothetical situa-
tion which has not as yet come to pass, even though it may occur at some point [because] it 
would … supplant the protection of fundamental rights which, in the nature of things, the 
ordinary … courts must also provide.’
96  Art 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code: the request of a foreign state’s organ may not 
be granted if, inter alia, its granting would constitute a violation of the Constitution of the 
Czech Republic. 
97  Alegre, Leaf, ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too 
Soon? Case Study - the European Arrest Warrant’ (2004) 10 Eur LJ 200, 216-217.
98  Art 55 (5) as amended in September 2006 (for the new wording, see n 71).
99  Framework Decision, Art 2 (2), covering a very broad list of vaguely called offences which 
are not subject to double criminality, including ‘computer-related crimes’ or ‘racism and 
xenophobia’. For instance, Tomuschat calls this the ‘list of horrors’. See Tomuschat (n 49) 
218. Personally, I fi nd the explanation of Advocate General Colomer far from satisfactory on 
this point. See the opinion of AG Colomer (n 43) paras 100-107. The Court in the same case 
touched the issue in its judgment even less satisfactorily. 
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say the least, unconvinced by this questionable novelty of European law; 
in fact, all of them delineated strong national limits. 
The German FCC addressed the problem of lifting the double crimi-
nality rule extensively. The legislature ensures that ‘[c]harges of criminal 
acts with such a signifi cant domestic connecting factor are, in principle, 
to be investigated in the domestic territory by German investigation au-
thorities if those suspected of the criminal act are German citizens.’100 
Thus, it would be impossible for a German national to be surrendered 
for an offence committed while being in Germany if the act itself was in-
nocent under German law.
The problems with the elimination of the double criminality require-
ment were overcome by ostensible formalism in the Czech decision: 
The enumeration of criminal offenses which do not require dual 
criminality is not given due to the fact that it would otherwise be 
presumed that some of these categories of conduct do not qualify as 
criminal offenses in one or more of the Member States; rather the 
exact opposite, that it is conduct which, in view of the values shared 
by the EU Member States, is criminal in all of them. The reason for 
enumerating them in this fashion is to speed up the execution of 
European Arrest Warrants, as the proceeding for ascertaining the 
criminality of such acts under Czech law has been dropped. In ad-
dition, in adopting this Framework Decision each EU Member State 
expressed its agreement that all criminal conduct coming within the 
categories defi ned in this way will also be criminally prosecuted.101
At fi rst glance, the Czech Court’s premises relating to the degree of 
harmonization of substantive criminal law are plainly wrong102 and con-
trary even to the opinion of the Court of Justice.103 The second reading 
of that provision might, however, be that this claim is not descriptive but 
rather normative. This reading is confi rmed by the Czech Court’s conces-
sion ‘that, under quite exceptional circumstances,’ the application of the 
EAW might be in confl ict with the Czech Constitution, especially if the 
distance offence ‘would qualify as a criminal act under the law of the re-
100  The German EAW case (n 49) para 85 (emphasis added).
101  The Czech EAW case (n 51) para 103.
102  Cf for a very different logic the German case (n 49) para 77 (emphasising that ‘the coop-
eration that is put into practice in the “Third Pillar” of the European Union in the shape of 
limited mutual recognition, which does not provide for a general harmonisation of the Mem-
ber States’ systems of criminal law, is a way of preserving national identity and statehood in 
a single European judicial area.’ Emphases added). 
103  Cf the Advocaten case (n 43) para 52: ‘The Framework Decision does not seek to har-
monise the criminal offences in question in respect of their constituent elements or of the 
penalties which they attract.’ According to para 59 ibid.
121CYELP 3 [2007] 99-133
questing state, but would not qualify as such under Czech criminal law, 
and perhaps would even enjoy constitutional protection in the Czech Re-
public (e.g. within the framework of the constitutional protection of free 
expression).’ Then the arrest warrant would not be executed.104 
This conclusion, however, raises more questions than it settles. 
What would happen, for instance, if, in the case where dual criminality is 
not verifi ed, the arrested person argues that the crime does not have its 
Czech equivalent? The CCC does not say explicitly. I suppose that such 
a case would force the Czech authorities to check double criminality and 
might establish grounds for the refusal to surrender due to confl ict with 
the constitution. Whether this would be the case only vis-à-vis distance 
offences (i.e. acts committed within the Czech territory), as the Court 
seems to indicate, or also some offences committed abroad, remains to 
be seen.
In sum, the problem of double criminality was at least partly solved 
in Germany by the legislature (as instructed by the GFCC). In contrast, 
the CCC attempted to solve this problem, but its decision stopped far 
short of any clear statement. In Poland, the issue has been resolved by 
the Constitution. Although the PCT did not address the issue, the Polish 
legislature, by amending Art 55 of the Constitution, reaffi rmed the double 
criminality requirement for extraditing Polish nationals. Therefore, the 
Polish legislature openly showed the constitutional limits for the imple-
mentation of the EAW in Poland. Still, what constitutes an offence ‘com-
mitted outside the territory’ of Poland remains, at least in tough cases, 
questionable.105
F Looking at Each Other: Comparative Arguments in the EAW 
Decisions
Although Maduro’s claim of vertical coherence among European 
high courts106 might seem to be far from the real style of judicial decision-
making in Europe, it is now well known that justices of Europe’s con-
stitutional courts carefully observe the corresponding decisions of their 
104  The Czech EAW case (n 51) para 114.
105  See Art 55 (quoted in n 71).
106  Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in N. Walk-
er (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart, Oxford 2003) 528 (according to Maduro when na-
tional courts apply EU law ‘they must do so in a manner as to make those decisions fi t the 
decisions taken’ not only by the ECJ but also by other national courts). Something like the 
Maduro’s claim exists in the practice of the application of law in the United States, where 
interstate comparisons and the use of persuasive precedents are courts’ daily routine. Cf 
Reimann, ‘Stepping Out of the European Shadow: Why Comparative Law in the United 
States Must Develop Its Own Agenda’ (1998) 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 637, 644.
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colleagues.107 Some courts perceive themselves as models to be followed, 
while others carefully listen and import foreign doctrines. The German 
FCC is the outstanding example of the former group, whereas post-com-
munist constitutional courts generally belong to the latter category. In 
this case, however, the Czech Court even dared to question indirectly 
some statements made by the FCC in its EAW case (though without do-
ing this openly).
The Polish Tribunal has dealt with the European case law in detail, 
but has not referred to Pupino for the obvious reason that the PCT had 
decided its case earlier. But even the Pupino case and the Euro-friendly 
construction would be of little help, as the Euro-friendly construction of 
national law is still merely a ‘construction’ and does not require rewriting 
the domestic law altogether.108
When reading the FCC’s decision, one can see the decision of the 
court which is well aware of its powerful position as the most respected 
constitutional court in Europe. Its reasoning is by and large self-referen-
tial (which is usually the case with the FCC): the FCC limits its attention 
to its own case law and domestic doctrine; a reader will not gain from the 
opinion any information that the ECJ had decided recently the Pupino 
case,109 which arguably should have infl uenced the FCC’s reasoning.110 
One should have no doubts that one of the addressees of its opinion is 
the ECJ itself.111
In striking contrast with the FCC, the CCC engaged in an extensive 
comparative exercise. In fact, it had been invited to do exactly this by the 
petitioners who alleged ‘the existence of a general, widely-shared consti-
tutional principle prohibiting a state from extraditing its own citizens’, 
which means that ‘the implementation of the EAW … cannot be effected 
otherwise than subsequent to a constitutional amendment.’112 
The CCC referred to numerous states which had amended their con-
stitutions, but it also highlighted that many states did implement the 
107  The Advocate General in Advocaten (n 43) referred to all decisions of the constitutional 
courts but the practical signifi cance of this reference for his reasoning seems to be close 
to nil.
108  According to Łazowski (n 44) 581.
109  Case C-105/03 Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 para 43. 
110  Cf the German EAW case (n 49) para 80, on the one hand, and the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Gerhard, on the other hand.
111  Cf the dissenting opinion of Justice Lübbe-Wolff, para 159 (it should not be within the 
competence of the GFCC to send ‘dark signals” to the ECJ in respect to the latter’s opinions 
which do not relate to the case at hand). Komárek opines that the addressees of those dark 
signals are also other Member States, primarily new ones, whose judiciaries enjoy question-
able reputation. See Komárek (n 44) 27.
112  The Czech EAW case (n 51) para 73.
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EAW without any constitutional amendment. Thus, there was no Europe-
an consensus on such a constitutional principle which effectively means 
that the existence of such a constitutional principle is purely a matter 
of national constitutional law.113 The CCC took pains to distinguish the 
judgment of its Polish counterpart, something completely unique even 
at the generally widely open gate of comparative law argumentation, to 
which the CCC seems to be inclined.114 The CCC repeatedly referred to 
the ECJ and its Pupino case, including the opinion of the Advocate-Gen-
eral.115 The CCC went even so far as to state that the primacy principle 
might yet apply within the third pillar law if the ECJ says so (taking into 
account that the ECJ’s case law is still ‘evolving’116). 
Conspicuously, the CCC seems to ignore entirely the respective Ger-
man judgment. It would, however, be a mistake to think that the German 
decision was unknown. First, dissenting justices do refer to the German 
judgment and some of them take it as the only correct answer for the 
Czech Court, too.117 Second, the German decision seems to be present 
even in the Czech majority opinion, but rather by way of negation. When 
reading the separate paragraph which stresses that the Czech consti-
tutional order will protect (through the envisioned judicial review of the 
constitutionality of individual arrest warrants) both Czech citizens’ con-
fi dence in Czech law and the confi dence and legal certainty of ‘other per-
sons, authorized to stay within the territory of the Czech Republic’,118 
113  Ibid paras 74-78. It is clear that almost all Continental nations do prohibit the extradi-
tion of their nationals (see generally Plachta (n 37)), although it is true that not all of them 
have incorporated this prohibition in their constitutions (see examples mentioned by the 
CCC).
114  The Czech EAW case (n 51) para 77: ‘[CCC] refers to the fact that, in contrast to the 
wording of Art 14 par. 4 of the Czech Charter, the formulation of Art. 55 par. 1 of the Polish 
Constitution excludes any form whatsoever of extradition of Polish citizens inclusive also of 
a surrender pursuant to the EAW. In comparison with the Czech constitutional order, the 
Polish Constitution leaves no room at all for it to be interpreted in harmony with the state’s 
obligations towards the EU.’
115  See ibid paras 58, 59 and 81.
116  See ibid para 59: ‘In the M. Pupino case, neither did the ECJ even touch upon the 
delicate issues of whether the principle of supremacy that it has expounded in relation to 
Community law applies in the same way to Union law, whether framework agreements are 
simply intergovernmental in nature, or whether some other interpretation is possible. It 
can, in consequence, be stated that ECJ doctrine concerning the exact nature of Union law 
acts such as framework agreements is still evolving.’ Justice E. Wagnerová in her dissent, 
on the contrary, criticised the majority of the Court for not distinguishing between the fi rst 
pillar law and the third pillar law.
117  Justice Wagnerová, joined in her dissent by another justice, in effect based her opinion 
on the German decision. What she proposed to the Czech Court was to repeat the decision 
of the Germans in the Czech scenario, ie to annul the Czech implementation without dis-
puting the constitutionality of the concept of the EAW itself. See the dissenting opinion by 
Wagnerová.
118  The Czech EAW case (n 51) para 113.
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one cannot but compare this to the dissenting opinion of Justice Lübbe-
Wolff.119 
IV The Delimitation of the National Constitution and European Law 
Compared 
In communist Europe, the very paradigm of the hierarchy of legal 
sources disappeared; a unifi ed legal order comprising enumerated sourc-
es of law prevailed only on paper and was displaced in genuine signifi -
cance by an enormous number of decrees of very different character, 
some of them even not promulgated in the offi cial gazettes. The central 
role of the act of parliament was typically abandoned. The most impor-
tant matters were dealt with in by-laws, ministerial decrees and govern-
ment regulations.120 
That is why the very notion of legal pluralism presents a serious 
challenge to Central European lawyers. While attempts at pluralist con-
ceptions of European Constitutionalism were increasing in Western Eu-
rope, post-communist Europe returned to the Kelsenian concept of the 
legal system as a pyramid. While for some Western Europeans this is an 
old-fashioned concept, for Central and Eastern Europeans this concept 
holds the charm of something precious lost and recently rediscovered. If 
Kumm claims that ‘[j]udicially articulated constitutional confl icts did not 
generally resonate strongly in the political sphere’121 this is defi nitely not 
valid for the post-communist political spheres.122
That is also one of the reasons the Polish Constitution of 1997 con-
tains a detailed chapter on the sources of law123 and one of the reasons 
post-communist lawyers in the new Member States adhere so adamantly 
to the classical Kelsenian paradigm of the legal system. Learning ‘co-
operative constitutionalism’ would challenge all these concepts deeply 
embedded within domestic legal traditions.124 Let us see to what extent 
these theories were challenged by the EAW cases in Poland and the Czech 
Republic.
119  Especially part 1a) of her dissenting opinion.
120  See Wronkowska, ‘The Sources of Law in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 
2 April 1997’ (1998) Polish Contemp. L Quarterly Rev Nos 1-4. 
121  Kumm (n 9) 280.
122  Cf the discussions in the Czech Senate on 14 April 2004 over some EU-related laws 
which were allegedly against the Czech Bill of Rights, available in Czech at: www.senat.cz 
accessed 18 October 2006, where Czech politicians discussed the issue of constitutional 
supremacy in the legalistic language.
123  Cf Wronkowska (n 120).
124  See on this Sajó, ‘Learning Co-operative Constitutionalism the Hard Way: the Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court Shying Away from EU Supremacy’ (2004) 2 Zeitschrift für Staats- 
und Europawissenschaften (ZSE) 351, 361.
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A The Polish Scenario: National Constitutional Supremacy 
The decisions of the Polish Tribunal show its willingness to sup-
port the application of EU law and to cooperate with the ECJ, as well 
as its readiness to become the ultimate guardian of the limits of EU law 
within the Polish constitutional system. Here, the EAW case must be read 
against the backdrop of other EU-related decisions. 
We have seen that in the EAW case, while listening to the arguments 
made by the ordinary court which referred the issue to the PCT, the Tri-
bunal showed that the Euro-friendly construction of national law had its 
limits: the plain text of the Constitution. In another important decision 
dealing with the Polish Accession Treaty, decided a few weeks after the 
EAW case on 11 May 2005, the PCT fi nally explained its general position 
with respect to the EU legal system.125 
Technically, in May 2005 the Tribunal decided on the constitution-
ality of the Accession Treaty signed on 16 April 2003, but the review 
inevitably covered both the EU Treaty and the EC Treaty. The PCT acted 
based on the referral made by deputies (members of the Sejm). The ques-
tion was whether the limits of the transfer of powers to an international 
organisation or institution provided by the Polish Constitution were ex-
ceeded.126 
The PCT, in its heavy German-style reasoning, again emphasised 
that the Constitution was the ‘supreme law of the Republic of Poland’, 
as stated after all in Art 8 (1) of the Constitution.127 Even though the 
Constitution provides for the transfer of State competences, this transfer 
is prohibited if it undermines the existence and functioning of State or-
gans. In short, the Constitution does not allow any transfer which would 
deprive Poland of its sovereignty, consequently making an international 
organisation sovereign.128 This has not happened with the current trans-
fer of powers, however.
125  The decision K 18/04 of 11 May 2005, published in Polish in OTK ZU (2005) ser A, nr 
5, item 49 (hereinafter Polish Accession Treaty Case). A short English summary is available 
on the Tribunal’s website. In English, see Kowalik-Bañczyk, ‘Should We Polish It Up? The 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law’ 6 German LJ. No 10 
(1 October 2005) <www.germanlawjournal.org> or in more detail by Wyrozumska (n 44).
126  The Polish Constitution provides that ‘[t]he Republic of Poland may, by virtue of inter-
national agreements, delegate to an international organization or international institution 
the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters.” Pol. Const. Art 
90 (1).
127  Part III.2.1 of the Polish Accession Treaty Case (n 125).
128  The Tribunal reasoned through Pol. Const. Art 4 (‘Supreme power in the Republic of 
Poland shall be vested in the Nation’) and Art 5 (‘The Republic of Poland shall safeguard its 
independence’).
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‘The dynamic nature of European integration does not signify an 
extension of the scope of the prerogatives of the EU’s organs to areas 
which are not encompassed by the transfer of competences,’ reasoned 
the Tribunal. That is why an international organisation is not able to 
determine its own competences ‘disregarding the appropriate procedures 
governing the transfer of competences by Member States on the basis of 
legal norms in force within these States.’ The Tribunal, following the rea-
soning of the famous Maastricht case by the GFCC, also claims for itself 
the kompetenz-kompetenz, the power to control whether the Community 
organs (including the ECJ itself) act within their competence.129
The PCT, in its minor deviation from the GFCC jurisprudence,130 
openly admitted that it might refer the issue of European law to the ECJ. 
The Member State has to respect ‘Community norms to the highest extent 
possible.’ That is why a preliminary question referred by the PCT to the 
ECJ concerning the validity or interpretation of Community law would 
not infringe ‘the superiority of the Constitution and the specifi c legal sta-
tus of the Constitutional Tribunal’. It is so because the PCT would refer 
the issue to the ECJ during an ‘examination of a case in which it would 
be obliged, on the basis of the Constitution, to apply Community law.’131 
The core normative claim on the relationship between EU law and 
national constitutional law made by the PCT seems to be embodied in the 
following paragraph:
Following Poland’s accession to the EU, there are two autonomous 
legal systems (i.e. those of Poland and the European Union) which 
are simultaneously in force. This does neither preclude, on the one 
hand, their mutual interaction nor, on the other hand, the possi-
bility of a confl ict between European law and the Constitution. In 
the event of any such confl ict occurring, it is for a sovereign deci-
129  Part III.4 of the Polish Accession Treaty Case (in 4.5 referring to the German Maastricht 
judgment and the Danish Carlsen judgment).
130  I emphasise minor because the German doctrine itself is in fl ux on this issue. As is well 
known, in the 1970s the GFCC originally accepted its status as a court according to the 
EC Treaty, Art 234 (ex 177). See BVerfGE 37, 271 (281-282), Solange I: ‘...the Federal Con-
stitutional Court does not decide on validity or invalidity of community law (die Gültigkeit 
oder Ungültigkeit einer Vorschrift des Gemeinschaftsrechts). At most, it can conclude that 
some provision cannot be applied by state authorities or courts if they are in confl ict with 
the constitutional rule dealing with basic rights. The Federal Constitutional Court can de-
cide incidental questions (Inzidentfragen) of the community law (similar to the ECJ), unless 
there are circumstances provided by Art 177 which binds also the Federal Constitutional 
Court ...’ (emphasis added). However, the GFCC has never referred a preliminary question to 
the ECJ. Instead, it sometimes fi nds what European law is by calling as experts employees 
of the Commission. Franz Mayer, The European Constitution and the Courts. Adjudicating 
European Constitutional Law in a Multilevel System. Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03.
131  See the Polish Accession Treaty Case, English summary (n 125) (emphasis added). In 
the Polish text, Part III.10 and 11.
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sion of the Republic of Poland whether to introduce an appropriate 
constitutional amendment, or to initiate amending the Community 
legal regulations, or, ultimately, to withdraw from the European Un-
ion.132
One might sum up that the Tribunal’s decision in the Polish Acces-
sion Treaty was based ostensibly on ‘National Constitutional Suprema-
cy’133 (NCS), and that its logic closely follows its German counterparts. 
This is not surprising considering the GFCC’s reputation in the post-
communist region. The German position seems to be very pragmatic, 
however, and the GFCC plays the card of its own judicial politics vis-à-
vis the ECJ.134 The PCT, in contrast, went far beyond the German juris-
prudence. It claimed the power to review both Community secondary law 
and the Polish laws implementing EU law for its confl icts with the Polish 
Constitution.135 However, taking the Polish Constitution as a minimum 
level of the protection of basic rights seems to be problematic and can 
hardly be enforced in practice.136 
On the other hand, the Polish Tribunal softened its hard version 
of NCS in the EAW case through its readiness to listen to EU needs by 
postponing the effects of its decision by eighteen months,137 as well as by 
urging the legislature to amend the Constitution and by emphasising the 
132  Idem.
133  Kumm (n 9) 266ff (distinguishing three normative approaches to the relation between 
European law and national law: European Constitutional Supremacy, National Constitu-
tional Supremacy, and fi nally the ‘sui generists’ who consider these questions unhelpful for 
daily practice. Subsequently, Kumm elaborates his approach which would fuel theory in 
the camp of the ‘sui generists’ and would explain more fully the question of the interrelation 
between a plethora of legal systems: Constitutionalism Beyond the State). 
134  Cf the text accompanying n 9.
135  Part III.18.5 of the Polish Accession Treaty Case (n 125).
136  The issue was discussed in the 1970s, and the ECJ’s claim of European Constitutional 
Supremacy refl ects the practical impossibility of verifying all individual national constitu-
tional standards (see Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125 para 
3, strongly emphasising the uniformity and effi cacy of community law). That is why the 
German FCC does not bind the level of the minimum protection of basic rights to the Ger-
man national legal standard on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the German Court claimed: 
‘As long as the European Communities, in particular European case law, generally ensure 
effective protection of fundamental rights as against the sovereign powers of the Communi-
ties which is to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights 
required unconditionally by the Basic Law, and in so far as they generally safeguard the 
essential content of fundamental rights, the FCC will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to 
decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation cited as the legal basis for 
any acts of German courts or authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and it will no longer review such legislation by the standard of fun-
damental rights contained in the Basic Law.’ See BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986), Solange II (legal 
sentence No 2, emphasis added).
137  According to Komárek (n 44) 13-14 and Wyrozumska (n 44) 20.
128 Zdeňek Kühn: The European Arrest Warrant, Third Pillar Law and National Constitutional...
desirability of the EAW within the Polish legal order. Last but not least, 
we should not overlook that the Polish Tribunal has repeatedly empha-
sised the value of the Euro-friendly construction of national law.138 
Unless adhering to the opposite version of ‘European Constitutional 
Supremacy’, one can hardly blame the Polish Tribunal for its decision in 
the EAW case, especially taking into account the importance of the prohi-
bition of the extradition of nationals within the Polish constitutional sys-
tem (as also proved, after all, by the subsequent constitutional amend-
ment). However, some conclusions made by the same court in the Polish 
Accession Treaty case seem to tilt the balance much more to the side of 
extreme National Constitutional Supremacy.
B The Czech EAW Case: Towards Soft European Constitutional 
Supremacy? 
Prior to 1 May 2004, the CCC acted similarly to its Polish counter-
part and supported the application of Czech law consistently with the 
requirements of EU law. The CCC emphasised the existence of general 
principles of law, common to all EU Member States. The content of these 
principles is derived from common European values; the general princi-
ples imbue with content the abstract concept of the state governed by the 
rule of law, which includes human rights. The Constitutional Court had 
to apply these principles prior to the Accession - thus it followed Euro-
pean legal culture and its constitutional traditions. ‘Primary Community 
law is not foreign law for the Constitutional Court, but to a wide degree it 
penetrates into the Court’s decision making - particularly in the form of 
general principles of European law.’139
It was not until 8 March 2006 that the Constitutional Court ex-
plained what the relation between the national Constitution and EU law 
should be. The case was the Sugar Quota II case, where the question was 
whether the EU sugar quotas were against the Czech Constitution.140 
In its reasoning in the Sugar Quota II case, the CCC re-emphasised the 
importance of the maxim of the interpretation of domestic law in a way 
consistent with EU law. In the Court’s view, the maxim acquired a new 
quality after the Accession: 
138  See the decision of 31 May 2004, K 15/04, the English summary at <www.trybunal.gov.
pl/Eng> published in Polish in OTK ZU 2004 ser A, nr 5, item 47, 655-668. In more detail, 
see Kühn, ‘The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several (Early) Pre-
dictions’ 6 German LJ No 3 (1 March 2005) <www.germanlawjournal.com>.
139  Milk Quota Case, published as No 410/2001 Offi cial Gazette (English translation avail-
able at: www.concourt.cz. For more detail on this, see Kühn, ‘The Application of European 
Law in Central European Candidate Countries’ (2003) 28 EL Rev 551.
140  Sugar Quota Case II of 8 March 2006, published as No 154/2006 Offi cial Gazette, avail-
able in English at: www.concourt.cz (I use this translation).
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Although the Constitutional Court’s referential framework has re-
mained, even since 1 May 2004, the norms of the Czech Republic’s 
constitutional order, the Constitutional Court cannot entirely over-
look the impact of Community law on the formation, application, 
and interpretation of national law, all the more so in a fi eld of law 
where the creation, operation, and aim of its provisions is immedi-
ately bound up with Community law. In other words, in this fi eld the 
Constitutional Court interprets constitutional law taking into account 
the principles arising from Community law. (emphasis added)
This maxim was even more stressed in the EAW case, when the CCC 
held: 
From Article 1 par. 2 of the Constitution, in conjunction with the 
principle of cooperation enshrined in Art. 10 of the EC Treaty, fol-
lows a constitutional principle according to which national legal en-
actments, including the Constitution, should whenever possible be 
interpreted in conformity with the process of European integration 
and the cooperation between European and Member State organs 
…141
According to the EAW case, this maxim is limited by the possible 
meaning of the constitutional text, which means that ‘if the national 
methodology for the interpretation of constitutional law does not enable 
a relevant norm to be interpreted in harmony with European Law, it is 
solely within the Constituent Assembly’s prerogative to amend the Con-
stitution.’ The second limit is implied by those essential attributes of a 
democratic law-based state which cannot be changed even by the Con-
stituent Assembly.142
Constitutional review of European laws is in principle excluded in 
the Czech Republic. Sugar Quota II approved the current standard within 
the Community for the protection of fundamental rights which is neither 
‘of a lower quality than the protection accorded in the Czech Republic,’ 
nor does the standard ‘markedly diverge from the standard up till now 
provided in the domestic setting by the Constitutional Court.’ The CCC 
emphasised that the delegation of part of the powers of national organs 
to the EU is conditional and ‘may persist only so long as these powers 
are exercised in a manner that is compatible with the preservation of the 
foundations of state sovereignty of the Czech Republic,’ and should not 
threaten the basic principles of the Czech constitutional order which are 
141  EAW Case (n 51) para 81 (the CCC referred to the decision of the Polish CT K 15/04 of 
31 May 2004 (n 138) and Pupino).
142  Ibid para 82. Similar caveats are made by the Polish EAW case (n 44) and the Accession 
Treaty case (n 125).
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not subject to revision (eternal law). If these conditions are threatened, 
the Constitutional Court would be ‘called upon to protect constitutional-
ism’143 and to exercise constitutional review. The CCC thus rephrased the 
famous Solange II decision.
The crucial question of both the Sugar Quota II and the EAW cases 
was whether the Constitutional Court should review domestic laws which 
implement EU obligations. In Sugar Quota II, the CCC held that if ‘the 
Community delegates powers back to the Members States for the purpose 
of implementing certain Community law acts, or if it leaves certain issues 
unregulated’, respective rules take the form of national law, and as such 
they must be in conformity with both EU law and the Czech Constitution. 
The domestic law (whether or not EU law gives the national legislature 
any discretion) is thus subject to full constitutional review, even though 
the maxim of European-conform interpretation applies.144
The EAW case does not seem to fi t easily into this line of thought. 
While Sugar Quota II relies on full (though Euro-friendly) constitutional 
review of domestic acts implementing EU law, a few weeks later the EAW 
case stated: 
[I]n areas where Community law applies exclusively, it is supreme, 
so that it cannot be contested by means of national law referential 
criteria, not even on the constitutional level. According to this doc-
trine the Constitutional Court would have no competence to decide on 
the constitutionality of a European Law norm, not even in the case 
that they are contained in legal enactments of the Czech Republic. Its 
competence to adjudge the constitutionality of Czech norms is, thus, 
restricted in the same respect. … [W]here the delegation of authority 
leaves the member states no room for discretion … the doctrine of 
primacy of Community law in principle does not permit the Consti-
tutional Court to review such Czech norm in terms of its conformity 
with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, naturally with 
the exception [of the alleged confl ict with the very essence of the sub-
stantive law-based state].145
Interestingly, this opinion was criticised as an unjustifi ed ‘shift’ 
by the Justice-Rapporteur of Sugar Quota II, who dissented in the EAW 
case.146 This doctrinal difference, however, does not make a substantial 
143  Sugar Quota II (n 140) part VI.B.
144  Sugar Quotas II (n 140) VI.A.
145  EAW Case (n 51) paras 52 and 54. 
146  See the dissenting opinion of Justice Wagnerová in the EAW case: ‘Today’s majority 
opinion shifts this doctrine [announced in Sugar Quota II], formulated by the Constitutional 
Court not even two months previously … In actuality, in the cited judgment the Constitu-
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difference in practice, because the CCC, despite its alleged self-restraint 
vis-à-vis the national laws implementing EU laws, did engage in a com-
plete review of the law. The only way to reconcile the difference between 
what the Court really did with what the Court had said it was about to 
do is to accept that all the arguments made by the petitioners were based 
on the ‘eternal’ constitutional core.147 Interpreted in this way, the soft 
European Constitutional Supremacy claimed by the CCC has lost much 
of its weight and in fact is close to Kumm’s concept of ‘Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State’ or Maduro’s Constitutional Pluralism.
V Conclusions
It is unlikely that the constitutional courts of the new EU Member 
States will refuse to accept the leading role exercised by the ECJ in the 
fi eld of European law. The constitutional courts, following the lead of 
their German archetype, view their primary position in respect of EU law, 
rather than as being ultimate guardians of national sovereignty and con-
stitutional traditions. 
The infl uence of the methodology and style of the German FCC on the 
post-communist constitutional courts is overwhelming.148 Consequently, 
the post-communist constitutional courts follow the general approach 
of the GFCC which prefers the identifi cation of general principles and 
values to the precise statement of concrete rules capable of settling every 
future dispute.149 Balance and symmetry of values is emphasised, and 
the reading of the Constitution is often a matter of compromise. On the 
other hand, the German style adopts the theory-like conceptualisation of 
the vague abstract constitutional principles. This more academic reason-
ing might easily be badly replicated; it also presents the danger of being 
unresponsive to societal needs.150 This might be even more problematic 
tional Court declared that in the case that powers are re-delegated from EC (EU) organs to 
organs of the Czech Republic (this still concerns the First Pillar of the EU), the Constitu-
tional Court will review legal norms resulting from that re-delegation from the perspective of 
the Czech constitutional order, in which case, however, it will interpret it with a view toward 
the ECJ case law on those principles which are identical with the principles contained in 
the Czech constitutional order’.
147  See EAW case (n 51) para 53, the last sentence: ‘In this matter, however, the petitioners 
asserted that, by adopting the European Arrest Warrant, just such a confl ict with the essen-
tial attributes of a democratic law-based state has come about’ (emphasis added).
148  Cf a former President of the HCC speaking about the ‘nearly overwhelming’ infl uence 
of the GFCC’s jurisprudence on his own Court’s case law. L Sólyom and G Brunner, Con-
stitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court (University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2000) 5. 
149  DM Beatty, ‘The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation’ (2001) 49 Am J 
Comp L 79. 
150  Cf Sajó, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in Light of Discourse Theory’ (1996) 17 Cardozo 
L Rev 1193 1219 (‘The typical constitutional tribunal decision is less interested in social 
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when the court lacks the power to deal with real-life cases and deals only 
with the abstract review of laws. The Polish Accession Treaty, with some 
of its claims going far beyond the German Solange II and Maastricht deci-
sions, illustrates this.
 In comparing the constitutional courts, one should see them in 
their political context. While there are countries where political parties 
are almost united vis-à-vis European questions (France or Germany as 
a typical example), many Central European countries are not. On the 
one hand, the detailed provision of Article 88 of the French Constitution 
regularly replies to the judgments of the French Constitutional Council 
in European matters. On the other hand, amending the Polish, Czech or 
Hungarian Constitution in the face of polarised political scenes and the 
presence of strong Euro-sceptic parties effectively suggests roundabout 
pressure on the constitutional courts to interpret their constitutions in a 
Euro-friendly manner and avoid the need for constitutional amendments. 
After all, as early as in 2004 the Czech Parliament rejected the govern-
ment’s attempt to amend the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
thus to confi rm explicitly the possibility of extraditing nationals.151
Facing these facts, we might explain the outspoken and strong ap-
peal of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal to its legislature to amend the 
Constitution. Perhaps in this way we might also read the crucial argu-
ment of the PCT in its later judgment on the Polish Accession Treaty that, 
after fi nding inconsistency between the domestic constitution and EU 
law, ‘it is for a sovereign decision of the Republic of Poland whether to in-
troduce an appropriate constitutional amendment, or to initiate amend-
ing the Community legal regulations, or, ultimately, to withdraw from 
the European Union.’152 In the example of the amendment to the Polish 
Constitution, we have seen how helpful a strong EU-friendly justifi cation 
of the judicial decision can be for the subsequent political process in a 
volatile parliamentary democracy.
Although being the most pro-EU decision in the EAW saga so far, the 
CCC did not entirely give up domestic constitutional requirements. Rath-
er, as we have seen, it engaged all ordinary judges in monitoring whether 
the minimum constitutional safeguards in the practice of the EAW were 
respected, and, in fact, whether some extreme cases of surrender under 
the EAW would really be so hypothetical and unlikely as the CCC pre-
dicted. Although, at fi rst glance, some of the statements made by the 
CCC might seem naïve (for instance, the general consistency of criminal 
consequences or even social values than it is in the correspondence of the decision to the 
principles that are partly stated in the constitution but, more often, are developed by the 
tribunal in reference to the constitution that they reshaped’). 
151  See the Czech EAW case (n 51) para 5.
152  See n 132 and the accompanying text.
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substantive law), another reading of the Czech judgment might be that 
if these tenets are not materialised in practice, the CCC has nonetheless 
left the gate open to intervene and to protect the minimal requirements of 
Czech constitutional law. 
On the other hand, the Czech decision shows the dangers when the 
Court pushes EU law hard against a passive legislature. One might won-
der whether it would be ultimately helpful for democracy if problematic 
EU rules were justifi ed by activist constitutional courts and by the tech-
nical language of law. Moreover, what is clear from the foregoing analysis 
is that in the enforcement of the EAW the CCC created a situation which 
was much less secure than in Germany or Poland. In the latter two coun-
tries, unlike the Czech Republic, the requirements for the enforcement of 
the EAW are now clearly stated in the German law and the Polish Con-
stitution.
Despite its strong rulings questioning some essential features of Eu-
ropean law (most notably the Solange I and Maastricht decisions), the 
German FCC has never caused any substantial damage to the applica-
tion of European law in Germany. A sceptic might perhaps expect that 
the complex doctrines of the GFCC would be badly imitated by the post-
communist constitutional courts, and that the German-made abstract 
principles would cause diffi culties in the application of European law in 
the new Member States. To what extent the post-communist constitu-
tional courts will be able to follow the FCC’s pragmatism in dealing with 
EU law remains to be seen. 
Still, the fi rst EAW cases from Poland and the Czech Republic show 
that the prospects are not necessarily bad. We have seen in the Czech 
and Polish examples that justices carefully monitor the positions of their 
foreign colleagues on comparable issues. Although their own conclusions 
might often seem to be pure and simplifi ed imitations of foreign models 
(the Polish Accession Treaty case as a primary example), sometimes too 
complicated and incomprehensible (the Czech Sugar Quota II case153), we 
can see that post-communist constitutional courts at least sometimes at-
tempt to bring new solutions and try hard to engage in European consti-
tutional dialogue and in building a Network of European Constitutional 
Pluralism.
153  I invite readers to judge for themselves: the full text of the decision is available in Eng-
lish at: <www.concourt.cz>
